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Previous studies have employed the bargaining model of war to explain likelihood of 
negotiation in intrastate conflict. Building upon this framework, this article provides an analysis 
of the effect of targeted UN sanctions on the onset of negotiations between warring parties in 
civil wars. Using novel monthly negotiation data and UN targeted sanction data from thirteen 
African civil wars between 1989 and 2020, my analysis finds that when sanctions target 
governments, negotiation onset is more likely. These findings contribute to the limited research 
on the effect of targeted sanctions on intrastate conflict and have important implications for 
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I. Introduction  
The use of sanctions as a tool of intrastate conflict resolution has changed significantly in the 
post-Cold War period. In the early 1990’s, comprehensive UN sanctions were frequently 
implemented as a tool to constrain regimes perceived to be bad actors in the international system. 
However, concerns about the ethics, human rights, and devastating impacts that total sanctions 
were having on civilian populations led to intense international backlash, particularly following 
the total sanctions regime in Iraq. Since then, comprehensive UN sanctions regimes have 
disappeared, and targeted measures have taken their place as tools of international conflict 
management. Despite relatively limited research on the efficacy of targeted sanctions in 
brokering peace, shortening conflict, and reducing conflict intensity, these targeted sanctions 
continue to be implemented, both by international organizations like the UN and EU, and 
unilaterally by individual states. 
Today there are ongoing targeted UN sanctions regimes in fourteen countries that are 
intended to support the settlement of conflicts, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
counterterrorism efforts (un.org). However, the effectiveness of targeted sanctions is largely 
unproven. Sanctions implemented by the UN and other international organization are often 
perceived as a relatively low-cost tool by which the international community can show 
commitment to taking action without dedicating troops or other higher cost interventions. Further 
scholarship seeking a more well-rounded understanding of how targeted sanctions impact 
conflict dynamics and support the peaceful resolution of conflict is essential to ensure. A better 
understanding of targeted sanction will ensure that these measures are employed in the most 
effective manner possible.  
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This paper seeks to explore the relationship between UN sanctions and negotiation onset in 
intrastate conflict. This analysis builds on previous scholarship which uses the bargaining theory 
of war to explain factors that contribute to the presence of negotiations in intrastate conflict. I 
argue that sanctions placed upon one of the warring parties, either the government or the rebel 
side, leads to asymmetric changes in power. As public information about the distribution of 
power becomes available, parties will choose whether or not to negotiate based on the new 
balance of power, affecting the likelihood of negotiation. Alternatively, sanctions that 
simultaneously target both rebels and the government lead to symmetric changes in power that 
do not impact the likelihood of negotiation onset because the overall balance of power has not 
changed. I test these hypotheses using negotiation and sanction data for thirteen African civil 
wars between 1989 and 2020. I find preliminary support for my theory that sanctions targeting 
government actors increase the likelihood of negotiation onset. 
These findings have important implications for scholarship on peacebuilding and the 
effectiveness of sanctions. Limited research exists on how international, and particularly UN 
sanctions, effect the likelihood of negotiation onset in intrastate conflict. Employing the 
bargaining model framework to analyze the effect of sanctions on negotiation onset builds on 
previous conflict resolution scholarship. The use of novel negotiation data, collected by a 
research team at the University of Iowa, provides important insight and further promotes the 
model that scholars should analyze peace as a process, rather than a single event.  
Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of sanctions in influencing negotiation onset 
contributes to smart and targeted policy that reduces the economic and human rights costs to 
both the senders and recipients when possible. Targeted sanctions impose costs on both senders 
and recipients, though sanctions are typically a less costly conflict intervention from a sender’s 
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perspective. Understanding how and under what conditions sanctions work to end conflict is 
critical for effective policy. Despite having fewer ethical and human rights concerns than total 
sanctions, targeted measures still incur criticism, and policymakers should ensuring that 
sanctions are employed where they will be most effective Examining the effectiveness of 
targeted sanctions in reducing conflict violence and ending conflict will contribute to the 
robustness of sanction policy in withstanding international criticism and bringing peace to 
countries in conflict.  
 




 Sanctions are a broad range of interventions that are increasingly employed in both inter- 
and intrastate conflict as a means to coerce, constrain, or signal international disapproval to one 
or more governments, warring parties, individuals, or corporate entities (Elliott; Giumelli; 
Biersteker et al.). UN Sanctions, which typically supplement unilateral and regional sanctions, 
provide legitimacy to international efforts to contain conflict. Sanctions “encompass a broad 
range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force” (un.org) and are an 
explicit tool of the UN Security Council, as stated in Article 41 of the UN Charter, requiring all 
193-members states to comply in implementing the agreed upon sanctioned measures. Since 
1966, there have been 30 sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council with 14 
regimes active in 2021 (Elliott; Biersteker et al.).  
In the post-Cold War environment, sanctions became a favored method of conflict 
containment, especially in wars where bad actors threatened to upend liberal world order. Early 
comprehensive UN Sanctions regimes targeted countries like Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti and 
Peace by Coercion? How UN Sanctions Impact the Occurrence of Peace Negotiations in Civil Wars 
 
6 
marked international disapproval anti-democratic regimes, state-sponsored terrorism, and the 
believed pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Elliott). Reports and images of malnourished 
and starving Iraqi and Haitian children in the early and mid-1990s led to harsh international 
outcry. Comprehensive sanctions were found to impact not only warring parties, but cause 
immense hardship among civilian populations, even when blanket humanitarian exemptions 
were allowed (Carisch et al.).  
Human rights concerns regarding the effect of sanctions on civilian populations have 
prompted studies analyzing health concerns of populations under sanctions versus under war 
conditions. The exposures experienced by civilian populations as a result of war differ from 
those experienced as a result of sanctions. Armed conflict exposes civilians directly to the 
possibility of death and disability, while sanctions prompt indirect health concerns such as 
reliable access to clean water, food, and quality healthcare. Despite these differing exposures, 
Allen and Lektzian find that sanctions which have limited economic effects on target countries as 
a whole have no substantial public health effects. However, when sanctions have large economic 
effects on target countries, public health consequences to the general population are similar to 
health outcomes associated with major military conflicts (Allen and Lektzian).  
The discovery of the immense adverse effects and human rights concerns that had 
occurred as a result of comprehensive sanctions regimes showed that sanctions violated the UN 
responsibility to stem conflict while upholding international norms and protecting citizens 
(Elliott). Beginning in the mid-1990s, UN sanctions shifted to become targeted or “smart”, 
seeking to reduce the negative effects of sanctions on the broader population and mitigate human 
rights concerns (Eriksson and Wallensteen). Targeted UN sanctions are almost always applied in 
conjunction with other conflict mitigation efforts such as mediation, peacekeeping, the threat or 
Peace by Coercion? How UN Sanctions Impact the Occurrence of Peace Negotiations in Civil Wars 
 
7 
use of force, or regional and unilateral sanctions. Today, the vast majority of sanctions are smart, 
targeting individuals, corporate entities, regions, or economic and political activities (Biersteker 
et al.). 
Targeted sanctions typically take shape in one of the following categories: individual, 
diplomatic, commodity, sectoral, financial, or territorial. Individual sanctions can include asset 
freezes or travel bans on individuals or corporations. Diplomatic sanctions typically restrict the 
activities of governments or other political entities by restricting visas or constraining activities 
of diplomatic personnel. Commodity sanctions seek to limit trade of a specific resource, typically 
natural resources. Sectoral sanctions place restrictions on specific industries including arms 
trade, technology, or transportation. Financial sanctions often include investment bans or 
restrictions on sovereign wealth funds. Lastly, territorial sanctions may limit sanctioning activity 
to a specific region (Biersteker et al.). 
Though targeted sanctions seek to, and largely succeed in, mitigating negative 
externalities that affect the health and well-being of the broader population, there are growing 
concerns about the ethics and legality of largely unregulated targeted sanctions regimes. 
Individual sanctions mark new territory for the United Nations, an entity that is accustomed to 
dealing with states and other international organizations. Critics worry that individual sanctions 
imposed by the UN violate individual, group, or corporate right to property, freedom of 
movement, fair hearing, and effective judicial review (Biersteker). The process of listing and 
delisting individuals, groups, and corporation from the UNSC Consolidated List has garnered 
scrutiny from over 50 member states due to the lack of transparency and due process. In addition 
to legal grey areas that surround the process of individual sanctioning, concerns about economic 
and psychological effects to individual as a result of being “listed” are also of note (Biersteker). 
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Efficacy of Sanctions 
 There is mixed understanding about the efficacy of UN sanctions and of international 
sanctions as a whole, especially in terms of intrastate conflict. Comprehensive sanctions that 
impose broad costs on the target are more likely to succeed (Drury; Cortright and Lopez) and to 
achieve coercive goals (Elliott; Escribà-Folch). There is conflicting evidence as to whether 
length of sanctions regimes and civil war duration are negatively or positively related. Economic 
intervention has been found to increase civil war duration (Regan) whereas reductions in private 
information, resources available to rebels, and expected payoffs from victory, all results of 
sanctions, have been shown to shorten civil wars (Strandow; Escribà-Folch; Collier and 
Hoeffler).   
 Sanction success can also be understood in terms of cost to sender. Sanctions, particularly 
targeted sanctions, are often seen as inexpensive interventions that allow senders to influence 
conflict dynamics at relatively low-cost, compared with other conflict interventions. However, 
without ample commitment, often translated as costs, by the sender, sanctions are unlikely to be 
effective (Lektzian and Regan). UN sanctions are typically reinforced with another method of 
conflict mitigation, and Lektzian and Regan suggest that peacekeeping forces are an effective 
way to demonstrate sender commitment to sanctions.  
 Characteristics of sanction senders, aside from demonstrated commitment, may also play 
a role in determining sanction success. Combined sanctions regimes, which often include 
regional or individual sanctions preceding UN sanctions, ultimately increase the effectiveness of 
UN sanctions (Brzoska). However, too many layered sanctions regimes yield potential for 
negative perception due to growing discontent among non-western states for unilateral sanctions 
that often precede UN sanctions regimes (Brzoska).. The role of international institutions such as 
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the UN as a unifying sanctioning body should not be understated. When many individual states 
cooperate to send unilateral sanctions in conjunction with each other, the effectiveness of 
sanctions actually decreases (Drury). Conversely, if an international body is present to coordinate 
the sanctioning effort, there is an increase in effectiveness of sanctions and probability of conflict 
termination (Drury; Escribà-Folch). Additionally, coercive effects of sanctions are greater if the 
target state is a member of the international institution that initiated sanctions (Escribà-Folch). 
 Though comprehensive study on sanction type and efficacy is lacking, certain sanction 
measures have proven to be more successful. Comprehensive economic embargoes have been 
found to be the most effective at producing coercive results and may also increase the likelihood 
of either military or negotiated end to conflict (Escribà-Folch). Contrastingly, sanctions that 
restrict arms trade seem to reduce the likelihood of military victory (Escribà-Folch) but may still 
contribute to a reduction in conflict duration because actions that target military power, such as 
arms embargoes, reduce uncertainty over military capabilities (Strandow).  
Measuring the success of sanctions in intrastate war proves to be more difficult. 
Difficulty arises because of the varying goals that accompany each separate sanction regime. 
Most sanctions imposed in civil wars seek one of three broad goals: to signal the disapproval of 
the international community, to constrain the ability of one or more warring parties to fight by 
limiting access to resources, or to coerce a change in behavior in one or more warring parties 
(Biersteker et al.; Elliott; Giumelli). However, secondary objectives and costs, often political, 
social, or economic against the sender or recipient, must also play a role when measuring the 
success of sanctions (Elliott). When analyzing all UN targeted sanctions between 1991 and 2012, 
Biersteker et al. find coercion to be the most common primary purpose, appearing in 56% of 
sanctions, though sanctions appear to be least effective in achieving this goal, finding success 
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only 10% of the time. UN sanctions are relatively more successful for goals of constraining and 
signaling, achieving positive outcomes 27% of the time (Biersteker et al.). 
 The debate on the effectiveness of sanctions remains, in part due to discrepancies in 
analysis methodology. Sanctions are often studied from a policy-making perspective and appeal 
to governments and international organizations as a low-cost way to manage conflict, but these 
perspectives fail to take into account conflict dynamics that may affect sanction success 
(Eriksson and Wallensteen). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered is one of the earliest 
comprehensive works on the success of economic sanctions, with three editions published 
between 1985 and 2007, is often cited in subsequent literature on success of sanctions. Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott find 11 indicators where sanctions are more likely to be successful and 
develop 9 policy recommendations that are supported by these findings (Hufbauer et al.). 
However, after altering their bivariate analysis to include control variables, Drury finds only four 
of eleven original findings and two of nine original policy recommendations to be supported 
(Drury). 
Negotiations 
Scholarship into why and under what conditions rebel groups and governments are 
incentivized to negotiate is somewhat limited. However, there are several generally accepted 
circumstances under which negotiation is more likely to take place. A shortcoming of many civil 
war literature is the practice of treating peace agreements as isolated bargaining events, rather 
than outcomes of multi-event negotiation processes, or treating each negotiation attempt as 
separate, rather than interconnected. What sets this analysis apart from other negotiation-related 
studies is the use of novel individual-level negotiation data, rather than monthly negotiation 
prevalence or agreement data that has previously been available. By using this micro-level 
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negotiation attempt data, this study seeks to further emphasize the importance of negotiations as 
a process, rather than a single bargaining event.  
Conflict scholars typically present war as the result of bargaining failure where parties 
face both information asymmetry and commitment problems (Fearon). Information asymmetry 
presents a major hurdle in bringing warring parties to the negotiating table. Power uncertainties 
that provoked conflict will continue, and parties will continue to fight, as long as the distribution 
of power remains unknown (Strandow). As fighting continues, information about relative power 
between warring parties becomes more accessible. As this occurs, warring parties must weigh 
their ability to impose costs upon an opponent as well as their ability to absorb costs that are 
inflicted by opponents in deciding to negotiate (Schelling). Typically, when rebel’s strength 
relative to the government increases, negotiations are more likely to occur. Similarly, if the 
government side undergoes losses that cause a diminished capacity to impose costs on rebels, it 
is more likely to participate in negotiations before experiencing further losses, and thus, 
diminished bargaining power (Hinkkainen Elliott et al.). 
Resolution of information asymmetry and the commencement of negotiations reveals the 
second hurdle of conflict resolution: commitment problems. Commitment problems refer to the 
dilemma under which no consequences exist to punish parties that renege on commitments made 
in peace agreements (Bapat). Commitment problems can be involuntary, referring to the inability 
of a party to deliver on a commitment, or voluntary, when a party purposely chooses not to 
deliver on a promise due to lack of credible enforcement. Third party interventions have been 
shown to mitigate commitment problems by serving as guarantors of peace (Maekawa et al.).  
Conflict dynamics such as rebel strength, conflict duration, and timing play important roles 
in determining whether or not negotiations will occur and if so, when they will occur. In conflicts 
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where rebel groups are well equipped militarily, as well as in conflicts with long duration, 
negotiations are more likely to occur. When a battlefield stalemate occurs, typically evidence of 
a strong rebel group, negotiations are more likely to occur. Rebel willingness, and often, desire 
to negotiate increases as a result of military stalemate due to a perceived enhancement in rebel 
bargaining position (Pechenkina and Thomas). 
Timing plays an important role in the bargaining model. Governments are hesitant to grant 
legitimacy to rebel groups early on and often refrain from negotiations, opting instead to defeat 
rebel groups using military force. However, if rebels resist government assaults, rebels will adapt 
and grow in strength, often leading to a mutually hurting stalemate. Under these conditions, 
negotiations are more likely. Using this logic, by negotiating earlier, governments can earn a 
relatively cheaper peace, meaning they will be able to attain peace without granting as many 
concessions as possible. However, the opposite typically occurs, and negotiations are most likely 
to occur after four or more years of fighting, once parties have reached a military stalemate 
(Bapat). 
III. Theory: Linking Targeted UN Sanctions and Negotiations 
The conditions under which negotiation between rebel and government parties take place can 
be understood using the bargaining model (Fearon, Schelling, Hinkkainen Elliott et al., Bapat, 
Pechenkina and Thomas). Parties’ descent into war is marked by power uncertainty, while the 
decision to negotiate comes as private information about the power balance between combatants 
becomes public and information asymmetries are resolved. I draw on the bargaining model to 
understand when negotiations are likely to occur in civil war, and the effect that UN sanctions 
can have on public information about power imbalances.  
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The bargaining model approach has been developed in civil war scholarship (Fearon, 
Schelling, Hinkkainen Elliott et al., Bapat, Pechenkina and Thomas) and argues that public 
information about the distribution of power incentivizes rebel groups and government actors to 
negotiate in different ways. In most circumstances, government actors determine if and when 
negotiations will take place. At the start of armed intrastate conflict, governments are often 
hesitant to grant legitimacy to rebel actors by holding talks with them and hope instead to end 
insurgency through military means. Negotiations are unlikely to occur at the beginning of civil 
conflicts due in large part to information asymmetries that lead government forces to believe 
they have significantly more power than rebels. Throughout the conflict, government forces 
remain unlikely to negotiate with rebel forces if they believe to have a disproportionate military 
advantage over rebels (Hinkkainen Elliott et al.). In the case of a vastly asymmetric distribution 
of power between rebels and government forces, government actors see military defeat as a less 
costly option given the alternative of offering rebels political or territorial concessions in order to 
end the insurgency.  
 Government actors are incentivized to negotiate as the power asymmetry between rebel 
forces and government forces shrinks. The balance of power can shift either through losses 
incurred by government forces, or gains made by rebels. Power changes can occur suddenly, 
such as an important rebel battle victory, or over time, as rebel groups tend to gain strength as the 
duration of a conflict increases. As power discrepancies between warring parties decrease, 
governments may no longer see military defeat of rebels as the least costly option. As this 
occurs, governments may seek to negotiate to minimize continue military losses that would 
further impact the balance of power, forcing governments to grant more concessions to rebels.  
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When events take place that reduce government power relative to rebel power, governments 
should be incentivized to negotiate. Governments seek to relinquish as little power as possible in 
the negotiating process by granting as few concessions as necessary to achieve a peace 
agreement with rebels. When governments are faced with an asymmetric decline in power 
relative to rebels, they seek to negotiate before incurring further losses which would force them 
to concede even more to rebels.  
Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Government Forces 
 UN sanctions targeting a government’s ability to inflict losses on rebel combatants 
narrows the power gap between rebels and government forces. This shift in power dynamics 
incentivizes governments to negotiate before suffering further losses and allows rebels to 
negotiate from a relatively more advantageous position. Possible UN sanctions that target 
government military power include restrictions on arms and other sectoral trade as well as 
commodity embargoes that restrict a government’s ability to earn capital, thus diminishing their 
battlefield capacity. Government losses as a result of UN sanctions do not imply that rebels 
become more powerful or even equally powerful to government forces, but rather have a 
relatively more favorable position from which to bargain from, incentivizing participation in 
negotiations.  
 As UN sanctions target the capacity of government forces, likelihood of negotiations 
between rebels and government actors will increase. This is a result of a change in public 
information about government power and the shrinking power asymmetry between warring 
parties, incentivizing both government and rebel actors to negotiate.  
Hypothesis 1. The implementation of UN sanctions against government actors increases the 
likelihood of the onset of negotiations between warring parties.  
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Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Rebel Groups 
 While government actors and third parties tend to set talks, rebels may decide whether or 
not to attend negotiations and whether or not to negotiate in good faith. Rebels seek to negotiate 
when their bargaining power is greater, or the perceived bargaining power of government actors 
is diminished. When rebels are weak, neither party is incentivized to negotiate because 
government forces see total military defeat as the least costly option for ending the insurgency, 
while rebels have little to no bargaining power to achieve desired concessions. Rebels are often 
weak at the beginning of a conflict, typically gaining military strength as conflict duration 
increases. Rebels may also be weakened by suffering military losses at the hands of government 
or third-party forces. 
 UN sanctions that target rebel groups seek to constrain the ability of rebel groups to fight 
by limiting resources, hindering recruitment, and causing territorial losses (Radtke and Jo). As 
the power asymmetry between rebels and government forces widens, conflict intensity and 
battle-related deaths will often decrease. However, as rebel groups become relatively weaker 
than government forces, negotiations are again disincentivized for both sides. When rebel group 
capacity has been substantially diminished, they no longer pose a powerful enough threat to 
legitimize their cause through negotiations with government actors, and instead, government 
forces will seek military victory.  
 As UN sanctions decrease rebel groups capacity, the power imbalance between warring 
parties will grow. A broad power asymmetry does not provide either party with incentives to 
negotiate, leading to a lower likelihood that negotiations will occur.  
Hypothesis 2. The implementation of UN sanctions against rebel actors decreases the likelihood 
of the onset of negotiations between warring parties. 
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Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Both Government Forces and Rebel Groups 
 I hypothesize that public changes to the power asymmetry, such as battle defeats, 
territorial losses, and loss to military capacity due to sanctioning, affect negotiation occurrence in 
intrastate conflict. Changes in the power distribution that affect all warring parties equally will 
have no effect on the relative distribution of power between parties and will bear no impact on 
the likelihood of negotiation. When UN sanctions are applied to both government and rebel 
forces, the overall balance of power will not change, and thus will have no effect on warring 
parties’ desire or likelihood of engaging in negotiations. 
Hypothesis 3. The implementation of UN sanctions against both government and rebel actors 
will have no effect on the likelihood of the onset of negotiations between warring parties. 
 
IV. Research Design  
The unit of analysis in this study is conflict month. My analysis employs civil war data from 
thirteen African civil wars from 1989 to 2020. The civil war data used in this analysis is taken 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed 
Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al.) which codes state-based armed conflict. Per the UCDP 
definition, state-based armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”  
I limit the scope of my analysis to thirteen African civil wars from 1989 to 2020 due to the 
availability of data. My research team had only compiled negotiation data for thirteen African 
wars that also coincided with the Targeted Sanctions Consortium and UCDP/PRIO datasets. 
Four African civil wars that received targeted UN sanctions between 1989 and 2020 were not 
included in my analysis: Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. To make my 
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analysis more generalizable to all targeted UN sanctions, I would like to collect individual-level 
negotiation data for the remaining civil wars that have been targets of UN sanctions.  
To test how targeted sanctions impact conflict resolution processes, I code one dependent 
variable, negotiation occurrence. A limitation of past studies related to negotiation attempts in 
civil war is the lack of comprehensive, individual-level negotiation data for each conflict. The 
individual-level negotiation data used in this analysis comes from a negotiation attempt dataset 
that I, in conjunction with several other undergraduates at the University of Iowa have compiled 
using open-source news articles from ReliefWeb and Lexis Nexis Academic. The research team 
has collected information about negotiation attempts in 25 African civil wars from 1989 to the 
present. In our dataset, a negotiation attempt is coded as a direct meeting between two or more 
combatant parties where one of the parties represents the contested government and where a 
political or military means to end the conflict is discussed. The resulting dataset codes conflict-
negotiations as the unit of analysis.  
In order to match the negotiation data with the UCDP/PRIO civil war dataset, I created a 
binary variable to code negotiation occurrence per conflict month. Conflict-months in which a 
negotiation occurred, whether starting, ongoing, or ending, were coded as 1, whereas months in 
which no negotiation occurred were coded as 0. When paired with the transformed UCDP/PRIO 
conflict-month data for thirteen conflicts, there were 135 conflict-months (11.1%) where 
negotiations occurred from 1989 to 2020.  
The independent variable in my analysis is targeted UN sanctions. I use data from the 
Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) Database which codes all UN targeted sanctions imposed 
between 1991 and 2013 (Biersteker et al.). The TSC is a comprehensive quantitative database of 
targeted UN sanctions and is the product of a collaboration between the Graduate Institute 
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Geneva, Uppsala University, and the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute. The TSC 
dataset codes over 200 variables, several of which indicate the primary target of sanctions for 
three different sanction purposes: coercion, constraint, and signaling. For the purpose of my 
analysis, I chose not to differentiate between sanction purpose, and looked instead at the binary 
indicator of the presence of sanctions. To test my hypotheses about the I created two binary 
variables to indicate the presence of target sanctions of any purpose against rebel groups and 
rebel leaders and sanctions of any purpose targeting the government and government leadership.  
To extend my analysis temporally, I collected sanctions data for each of the thirteen conflicts 
for 1989-1990 and 2014-2020. To collect information on sanction start date, end date, and target, 
I used open source reports from the United Nations. Collecting sanction data for these additional 
years allows me to more completely analyze the UN sanctions regimes in these thirteen conflicts 
and allows me to utilize the negotiation data that my team collected through 2020. After 
compiling these data, my analysis includes 1,219 conflict months clustered over thirteen different 
African civil wars with a range of 1 to 378 conflict-months and an average of 247 conflict-
months. 
These data are organized by civil war month until the onset of a negotiation. Cases of civil 
war months continues until a negotiation occurs and the binary negotiation dependent variable is 
coded 1. Successive civil war months where negotiations continue after the initial start-month of 
negotiation are not included in the data. If the negotiations end and do not produce an end to the 
armed conflict, civil war months for that particular civil war start again in the data.   
I also employ a time variable to measure the time trend until a negotiation occurs. I include 
time, time2, and time3 in my analysis. After using AIC to select the best fit model, I included 
time, time2, and time3 in my model.  
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In my analysis, I will fit a logistic regression to examine the probability of negotiation 
occurrence given sanctions that target either the government, rebels, or both simultaneously. I am 
using a logistical regression because my dependent variable, negotiation occurrence, is binary. 
The results of this test are reported in Table 2.  
V. Presentation & Discussion of Results 
 
Table 1. Data Summary 





Algeria 1-Jan-1991 - 5 
Central African Republic 27-May-2001 - 4 
Chad 18-Dec-2005 - 11 
Comoros 3-Sep-1997 - 1 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2-Jul-1998 28-Jun-2003 16 
Guinea-Bissau 7-Jun-1998 - 3 
Ivory Coast 19-Sep-2002 15-Nov-2004 14 
Liberia 1-Jan-1989 19-Nov-1992 11 
Libya 28-Feb-2011 26-Feb-2011 13 
Mali 10-Jun-2009 - 6 
Nigeria 4-Jun-2004 - 1 
Somalia 1-Jan-1991 23-Jan-1992 34 
South Sudan 20-Aug-2011 15-Mar-2015 16 
 
Table 1 shows the location and start date of the thirteen African civil wars analyzed. The 
table also shows the start date of targeted UN sanctions regimes, if they occurred in the country 
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at the time of conflict. Six of the thirteen conflicts analyzed experienced UN sanctions regimes 
that coincided with the unit of analysis, civil war month. Table 1 also shows the frequency of 
negotiation onset in each of the thirteen conflicts. The average number of renewed negotiation 
onsets per conflict is 10.4 with a range of 1 to 34 onsets.  
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression of Negotiation Occurrence by Sanction Target 
 Coefficient 
Sanctions Targeting Rebels -0.1000 (.157) 
Sanctions Targeting Government 0.8058* (.412) 
Sanctions Targeting Both  -0.1915 (.236) 
t -0.0621** (.0224) 
t2 0.000145 (.0006) 
t3 0.00000095 (.000004) 




*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
As seen in Table 2, when there is a presence of sanctions that target government actors, the 
odds of a negotiation occurring increases by nearly 224%, found by exponentiating the 
coefficient (.8058), when compared to when there are no sanctions at all. This result is 
significant at the 95% confidence level. These results hold with my hypothesis which suggests 
that a decrease in government strength relative to rebel strength incentivizes government actors 
to open negotiations with rebels.   
In cases where UN sanctions target both the government and rebel actors simultaneously, a 
negative, but not statistically significant relationship occurs. The lack of a statistically significant 
relationship supports my theory that when sanctions target both rebels and the government, 
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causing symmetric power shifts, there is no substantial change in the probability of an onset of 
negotiations.   
Where sanctions target only rebel groups, my analysis points to a slight, but not statistically 
significant, negative relationship between sanctions that target rebel groups and negotiation 
occurrence. While not significant, this relationship holds with my original hypothesis that 
sanctions targeting rebel groups are likely to decrease negotiation occurrence.  
The time variable I employed in this analysis is significant only in the original form and 
points to a negative relationship between civil war months and likelihood of negotiation 
occurrence. As duration of civil war increases, the odds of a negotiation occurring decrease by 
94%. This breaks with findings that negotiations between rebels and the government are less 
likely at the start of conflicts but reaching peak likelihood after four years of armed combat 
(Bapat). This unexpected relationship may be a function of the thirteen cases I used in my 
analysis, several of which are wars with particularly long duration. In these cases, it may be the 
case that as conflict duration increases and successive negotiation attempts fail to produce 
agreements that facilitate lasting peace, parties choose to stop engaging in negotiations 
altogether.  
A limitation of this analysis is that the data on UN sanctions that I employed does not 
differentiate between strength and comprehensiveness of measures. Different sanctions measures 
have been shown to have differing impacts on conflict dynamics and certainly have the ability to 
affect the balance of power between parties in differing ways. In further study, it would be 
interesting to use more detailed sanctions variables to see how different types of UN sanctions 
change the likelihood of negotiations. This more detailed analysis would provide additional 
insight cases where sanctions are applied to both government and rebel groups, as sanction 
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regimes are unlikely to cause the same level of losses to both parties. More detailed sanction data 
will also make important distinctions where sanctions are applied to individual rebel and 
government actors, either simultaneously or separately, as these are unlikely to have the same 
effects on bargaining power as, for example, an arms embargo.  
VI. Conclusion 
Sanctions have long been a tool for conflict management and since the virtual disappearance 
of the use of total sanctions by the United Nations in the mid-1990s, targeted sanctions against 
specific individuals, groups, or entities have taken over as non-combative means of conflict 
intervention. The effectiveness of targeted sanctions in easing and ending conflict is 
understudied, and this paper attempts to answer the question: in intrastate conflict, how do 
targeted sanctions impact the likelihood that warring parties will negotiate? 
 I attempted to assess the effect of targeted sanctions on negotiation onset when sanctions 
target only rebels, only the government, or both simultaneously. The results of my analysis 
indicate some support for my second hypothesis, that sanctions targeting only the government 
lead to an increased probability of negotiation onset. This could be because sanctions targeting 
the government lead to a decrease in government bargaining power, incentivizing government 
actors to commit to talks at the risk of incurring further losses to their bargaining position.  
 This analysis is a preliminary look at the effect of targeted sanctions on negotiation onset. 
Future study should differentiate between sanction types and strength to assess the effectiveness 
of differing sanctions in incentivizing parties to negotiate. Future analysis should also 
incorporate controls for additional regional sanctions, conflict intensity, a measure of polity, 
conflict type, and recurrence of conflict. Controlling for these measures will increase the validity 
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of the results discussed in this paper and allow for a more complete explanation of the impact of 
sanctions on negotiations in intrastate conflict.  
 Beyond contributing to the greater literature on intrastate conflict and international 
sanctions, this paper seeks to inform sanction policy. As international scrutiny of targeted 
sanctions increases, policymakers must prove that the benefits outweigh the costs for both 
senders and recipients and that sanctions constitute an effective tool for conflict management. 
Though more analysis is needed, this paper points to the effectiveness of sanctions that target 
government regimes in increasing the probability of the onset of talks between warring parties, 
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